Former Nodus Bank CEO Sentenced: 112 Months for Fraud and Venezuela Sanctions Evasion

Former Nodus Bank CEO sentenced: the 112-month term at a glance

Niembro received 112 months' imprisonment, just over nine years, after pleading guilty to two conspiracy counts: conspiracy to commit wire fraud and conspiracy to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). He is 64 and holds Spanish and Venezuelan nationality. He was the bank's chief executive and, according to Puerto Rico's banking regulator, its president and the owner of 60% of its shares.

He entered his plea on 19 March 2026 to a two-count information, a charging document used when a defendant agrees to plead without an indictment. When the plea was announced, the Justice Department said each count carried a maximum of 20 years in prison and that sentencing was set for 8 June. The hearing slipped, as federal sentencing dates often do, and the sentence was imposed on Monday 21 September. American Banker reported that a separate restitution hearing is set for 17 December, so the amount he must repay victims is still to be fixed.

Element	Outcome
Defendant	Tomás Niembro Concha, 64, former CEO of Nodus International Bank
Court	US District Court for the Southern District of Florida
Offences	Conspiracy to commit wire fraud; conspiracy to violate IEEPA
Plea	Guilty, 19 March 2026
Custodial sentence	112 months
Supervised release	Three years after release
Forfeiture	More than $16.9 million, the proceeds he derived from the fraud
Fraud on the bank	At least $24.9 million
Restitution	Hearing listed for 17 December 2026

Announcing the sentence, Assistant Attorney General A. Tysen Duva of the Criminal Division said the defendant had abused his position "to commit fraud for his own enrichment and to willfully evade sanctions on a designated individual". The case was investigated by IRS Criminal Investigation, with support from Puerto Rico's Office of the Commissioner of Financial Institutions (OCIF) and the Treasury Executive Office for Asset Forfeiture, and prosecuted by the Criminal Division's Bank Integrity Unit with the US Attorney's Office in Miami. For executives facing a similar investigation, the first call is usually to criminal and white-collar defence counsel.

How the fraud worked: sham investments and 47 promissory notes

The fraud was a textbook case of insider lending dressed up as ordinary banking business: money left Nodus as apparently arm's-length investments and loan purchases, and ended up with the two men who controlled the bank. According to the court filings summarised by the Justice Department, Niembro and the bank's chairman, Juan Ramirez, hid from the rest of the board, from senior executives and from OCIF that certain investments and loans were for their own benefit, in breach of Puerto Rican law.

There were two channels. First, from 2017 to 2023, Niembro, Ramirez and others caused Nodus to invest $11 million in a Miami-based lender so that the lender could lend those funds back to Niembro and Ramirez. The investments were shams, designed to disguise what were in substance loans to insiders. Second, between January 2018 and September 2021, the two men induced the board and the bank's comptroller to buy at least 47 promissory notes, totalling about $25.3 million, from Nodus Finance, a Miami company they jointly owned.

The notes purported to fund loans to genuine borrowers. In Ramirez's own plea, the Justice Department said the proceeds were in fact used to make personal investments, pay personal mortgages and cover personal credit card bills. Because the notes were bought by the bank on the recommendation of its own chief executive and chairman, the transactions passed through the bank's approval process and looked, on paper, like routine credit decisions.

• The Miami lender channel. $11 million of bank money invested between 2017 and 2023, then lent on to the insiders.
• The Nodus Finance channel. At least 47 promissory notes, about $25.3 million, bought between January 2018 and September 2021 from a company the two insiders owned.
• The concealment. Other directors, executives and the regulator were not told that the insiders were the real beneficiaries.

The Miami lender's owner, Emilio Santandreu, was also prosecuted. American Banker reports that he was sentenced to 34 months, later reduced to 22 months. The pattern of the scheme, with bank funds moving through affiliated vehicles before reaching insiders, is exactly what forensic investigators are asked to trace when a bank fails, and why economic crime specialists treat related-party flows as the first place to look.

The loan portfolio swap on the eve of liquidation

The most brazen step came when the bank was already dying: weeks before liquidation began, the insiders caused Nodus to take a portfolio of largely worthless loans in settlement of the debt their own company owed it. In early March 2023 OCIF told Nodus it intended to place the bank into liquidation, and later that month Nodus agreed to a voluntary liquidation.

On 28 April 2023, knowing that the liquidation was about to start and without OCIF's authorisation, Ramirez and a co-conspirator caused Nodus to buy from their Miami finance company a loan portfolio of about $26 million. The Ramirez plea release states that most of those loans were delinquent, non-performing or uncollateralised, and that Nodus accepted the portfolio as payment of the finance company's debt on the 47 promissory notes. The effect was to wipe out the insiders' company's liability to the bank and to leave the bank, and ultimately its depositors, holding paper of little value.

Niembro's sentencing release describes the same manoeuvre from his side: he and Ramirez fraudulently caused the bank to accept the Nodus Finance loan portfolio to pay down the promissory note debt. For liquidators and creditors, transactions of this kind in the run-up to insolvency are the classic target of clawback and director liability claims, which is where insolvency and restructuring advisers come in.

The Venezuela sanctions evasion: a licensed foreclosure and a "private" buy-back

The sanctions count arose from a single property deal: Niembro helped a Venezuelan sanctioned under the US programme recover his Southampton, New York home through a front company after the bank had foreclosed on it with a licence from the Treasury. The individual, whom the Justice Department has not named, had been added to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) for providing material support to Venezuela's state oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA).

The SDN's company owed Nodus about $2.5 million on a loan made before the sanctions were imposed. Once a person is designated, US persons may not deal in his property or interests in property without OFAC's permission, so collecting the debt required a licence. Between 2021 and 2023, the Justice Department says, Niembro and the SDN devised a scheme in which Nodus would foreclose on the SDN's Southampton home, a step for which they obtained OFAC authorisation. Separately, they reached a "private" agreement that the bank would then sell the property back to the SDN for $4 million through a front company. That onward sale was strictly prohibited by US sanctions and not otherwise licensed by OFAC.

The structure is instructive because it used a lawful step to launder an unlawful one. The foreclosure was authorised, and a regulator reviewing the file would have seen a licensed recovery of a legitimate pre-sanctions loan. What OFAC did not authorise, and would not have been asked about, was the return of the asset to the sanctioned owner, hidden behind a corporate buyer. A licence covers only the transaction it describes; anything added outside its terms falls back under the general prohibition.

Real estate is a recognised channel for this kind of evasion. In a 2023 alert on sanctioned Russian elites, FinCEN warned that sanctioned persons use shell companies, trusts and third parties such as relatives and business associates to hide their interest in property. The red flags translate directly to Venezuela and any other programme, and they are why real estate lawyers acting on sales of foreclosed or distressed assets increasingly screen the ultimate buyer, not just the named purchaser.

Is Venezuela still under sanctions? Why the 2026 easing does not help

Yes: despite a wave of general licences in 2026, the core Venezuela sanctions remain in force, and in any case a change in policy does not cancel liability for past violations. PDVSA was designated on 28 January 2019 under Executive Order 13850, which blocked all of its property within US jurisdiction and generally barred US persons from dealing with it. The individual in the Nodus case was designated for supporting PDVSA, and the conspiracy ran from 2021 to 2023, when those restrictions were fully in place.

The picture has shifted since the capture of Nicolás Maduro on 3 January 2026. OFAC has issued a series of general licences reopening parts of the oil sector, culminating on 18 March 2026 in General License 52, which authorises a broad range of energy transactions with PDVSA. But as a Faegre Drinker analysis of the changes points out, no Venezuela-related executive order has been revoked, PDVSA and the Central Bank of Venezuela remain on the SDN list, and general licences can be rescinded or amended quickly. The underlying rules are set out in the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations at 31 CFR Part 591 and on OFAC's Venezuela programme page.

Two points follow for anyone with Venezuelan exposure. First, a general licence permits only what it describes; dealings with individual SDNs outside its scope remain prohibited. Second, criminal liability is fixed by the law in force when the conduct occurred, so the 2026 thaw offers no defence for a 2021 to 2023 conspiracy. Businesses re-entering the market should take local advice from advisers in Venezuela alongside US sanctions counsel.

What is the maximum penalty for an OFAC violation?

For a wilful violation of IEEPA, including a conspiracy, the maximum criminal penalty is a fine of $1,000,000 and, for an individual, up to 20 years in prison; civil penalties can reach the greater of $377,700 or twice the value of the transaction. Section 1705 of IEEPA makes it unlawful to violate, attempt to violate, conspire to violate or cause a violation of any order or regulation issued under the Act, which is the basis for the conspiracy count to which Niembro pleaded guilty.

The civil figure is adjusted for inflation each year. The current $377,700 ceiling comes from OFAC's January 2025 adjustment; there has been no 2026 increase because the Office of Management and Budget announced in April that no inflation adjustment would be made for 2026. OFAC publishes its enforcement actions and guidelines on its civil penalties page.

Route	Who brings it	Standard	Maximum penalty
Civil enforcement	OFAC	Strict liability; no intent required	Greater of $377,700 or twice the transaction value, per violation
Criminal prosecution	Department of Justice	Wilful violation, attempt or conspiracy	$1,000,000 fine; up to 20 years in prison for individuals
Limitation period	Both	Runs from the violation	10 years since April 2024

The limitation period matters in cases like this one, which surface years after the conduct. In April 2024 Congress doubled the statute of limitations for IEEPA and Trading with the Enemy Act violations from five to ten years, for both civil and criminal cases, and applied the change to violations not already time-barred. Our earlier analysis of how US secondary sanctions work explains how the same penalty framework reaches non-US banks, and OFAC sanctions advisers can assess exposure on a specific transaction.

What is the jail sentence for bank fraud, and how the 112 months will be served

There is no single jail sentence for bank fraud: in US federal courts the judge works from statutory maximums and the Sentencing Guidelines, and Niembro's 112 months sits well below the combined 40-year maximum his two counts carried. Strictly, he was not convicted of bank fraud but of conspiracy to commit wire fraud. Under 18 USC 1349, a fraud conspiracy carries the same penalties as the underlying offence, and the wire fraud statute provides for up to 20 years, which is the maximum the Justice Department cited for each count.

How a judge arrives at a figure within that range depends on the loss amount, the defendant's role, abuse of a position of trust, acceptance of responsibility and the other factors the court must weigh. The court's detailed reasoning and the guidelines calculation in this case have not been published, so it is not possible to say how far the sentence departed from the guidelines range.

Federal prisoners do not get parole. The main reduction available is credit for good conduct: under 18 USC 3624(b), a prisoner serving more than a year can earn up to 54 days for each year of the sentence imposed. After release, Niembro will serve three years of supervised release under 18 USC 3583, during which breaches of conditions can send him back to prison. Routes to early release remain narrow; the Supreme Court's recent compassionate release ruling shut off one of them, holding that sentencing reforms which are not retroactive cannot be relied on as grounds for compassionate release.

• Imprisonment. 112 months, reduced only by earned good-conduct credit.
• Forfeiture. More than $16.9 million, reflecting the proceeds he personally obtained. Forfeiture is separate from restitution, which compensates victims.
• Restitution. To be determined at the 17 December hearing.
• Supervised release. Three years, with conditions set by the court.

How Nodus International Bank failed: Puerto Rico's international banking entity regime

Nodus was an international banking entity, a type of offshore bank licensed in Puerto Rico to serve non-resident clients, and its depositors were not protected by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. It was organised under Law 52 of 11 August 1989, the International Banking Center Regulatory Act, and supervised by OCIF. American Banker notes that because Nodus was an international bank in Puerto Rico, its deposits were not insured by the FDIC.

The regulator's concerns went back a long way. According to Associated Press reporting, Nodus obtained its licence in 2009 and began business in 2010; by February 2012 OCIF was investigating and found breaches of anti-money laundering rules, and by October 2017 it had identified "serious financial and managerial deficiencies". The end came in stages:

1. Early March 2023: OCIF notified the bank that it would be placed into liquidation.
2. 8 May 2023: OCIF, Nodus and its shareholders signed a plan for voluntary liquidation and dissolution.
3. 16 October 2023: OCIF revoked the operating licence and placed Nodus in permanent receivership until the liquidation is complete.
4. 4 April 2024: OCIF issued a complaint and order piercing the corporate veil.

The April 2024 order was unusually aggressive. OCIF found that even after the liquidation plan and the licence revocation, Niembro and Ramirez had continued to make unauthorised payments to themselves and tried to move depositors' accounts to other institutions they controlled. It held Niembro, the 60% shareholder, and Ramirez, who held the other 40%, personally and jointly liable for the bank's debts, ordered them to put up $26,825,189. 48 for depositors and creditors, and banned both from doing business in Puerto Rico for ten years.

In February 2025 the trustee overseeing the liquidation, Driven, sued the two owners in federal court in South Florida, alleging that they "treated depositor funds at Nodus as their own personal piggy bank" and stating that Nodus owed clients some $92 million.

For depositors based in Venezuela and elsewhere, recovery will depend on tracing assets across borders, a process that raises the recognition and service questions discussed in our analyses of cross-border insolvency recognition and serving bankruptcy claims abroad. Advisers in Puerto Rico handle the local receivership.

The co-defendants and what happens next

Niembro is the most senior figure to be sentenced so far, but the prosecution is not over: the chairman and a former director have pleaded guilty and await sentence, and the restitution figure is still to be set. Juan Francisco Ramirez, 60, of Miami, pleaded guilty on 22 September 2025 to conspiracy to commit wire fraud, admitting a scheme to obtain more than $13.6 million from the bank, and agreed to forfeit at least that sum. American Banker reported on 22 September 2026 that he has yet to be sentenced. Jose Gregorio Suarez, a former Nodus director who was business development and general manager at Nodus Finance, has also pleaded guilty and awaits sentence.

Defendant	Role	Status at 22 September 2026
Tomás Niembro Concha	CEO and 60% shareholder	Sentenced 21 September 2026 to 112 months; forfeiture over $16.9m; restitution hearing 17 December
Juan Francisco Ramirez	Chairman and 40% shareholder	Pleaded guilty 22 September 2025; forfeiture of at least $13.6m agreed; awaiting sentence
Emilio Santandreu	Owner of the Miami lender	Sentenced to 34 months, later reduced to 22 months
Jose Gregorio Suarez	Former director; manager at Nodus Finance	Pleaded guilty; awaiting sentence

Date	Event
2009 to 2010	Nodus licensed in Puerto Rico and begins business
2017	Start of the Miami lender scheme; OCIF finds serious deficiencies
January 2018 to September 2021	47 promissory notes bought from Nodus Finance
2021 to 2023	Southampton sanctions evasion conspiracy
Early March 2023	OCIF gives notice of liquidation
28 April 2023	About $26m loan portfolio accepted from Nodus Finance
16 October 2023	Licence revoked; permanent receivership
4 April 2024	OCIF pierces the corporate veil
22 September 2025	Ramirez pleads guilty
19 March 2026	Niembro pleads guilty
21 September 2026	Niembro sentenced to 112 months
17 December 2026	Restitution hearing

Forfeited assets can in some cases be applied to compensate victims, and forfeiture of fraud proceeds rests on provisions such as 18 USC 981. For the Florida proceedings and the trustee's civil claim, lawyers in Florida will be the ones at the table.

Lessons for boards, compliance teams and general counsel

The central lesson of the case is that controls designed to catch outsiders do little when the people committing the fraud are the people who approve the transactions. At Nodus the CEO and the chairman were also the owners, and the promissory notes and investments went through the board and the comptroller. Four practical points stand out.

• Related-party lending needs independent eyes. Any exposure that could benefit a director, officer or shareholder, directly or through an affiliated company, should be identified, disclosed and approved by directors with no interest, with the regulator informed where the law requires it. The Nodus schemes worked because the beneficial interest was hidden.
• A licence is a boundary, not a blessing. The Southampton foreclosure was licensed; the buy-back was not. Compliance teams should map every step of a licensed transaction against the licence's wording and treat any side agreement with a sanctioned party as a red flag.
• Look through the buyer. The $4 million sale ran through a front company. FinCEN's real estate typologies, including shell companies and third-party nominees, apply to any bank disposing of assets that once belonged to a designated person.
• Distressed periods are high-risk periods. The worst transaction, the $26 million portfolio swap, happened after the regulator had signalled liquidation. Boards and regulators should freeze insider dealings once a bank is in resolution.

OFAC's own guidance makes the same points. Its Framework for OFAC Compliance Commitments identifies five essential components of a sanctions programme: management commitment, risk assessment, internal controls, testing and auditing, and training. Its appendix of root causes of past violations includes individual liability, noting that supervisory, managerial and executive employees have often played integral roles in causing or facilitating violations. The Nodus case is that root cause in its purest form.

For general counsel, the case also shows how enforcement agencies combine. IRS Criminal Investigation led the inquiry, the Justice Department's Bank Integrity Unit prosecuted it, the local regulator supplied the evidence of concealment, and the Treasury's forfeiture office followed the money. A problem that starts as a supervisory finding can end as a criminal case years later, particularly now that the sanctions limitation period is ten years. Where a board suspects insider abuse, an early, privileged internal investigation is usually the safest first step, and banking and finance lawyers can review related-party and licensing controls.

When to take specialist advice

Specialist advice is worth taking as soon as a bank, lender or investor finds a transaction that could touch a sanctioned person or benefit an insider, and before anyone relies on a licence for more than it says. The facts in this case, a pre-sanctions loan, a licensed foreclosure and a later sale, are common in restructurings of Venezuelan and other sanctioned-country exposures, and each step needs separate analysis.

Directors who learn of possible wrongdoing will also need to consider voluntary self-disclosure to OFAC or the Justice Department, their duties to the regulator, and their own personal exposure. Those decisions are time-sensitive and usually call for sanctions counsel, white-collar defence lawyers and, where assets have moved across borders, local advisers in each jurisdiction. The Corporate INTL Find an Expert directory lists advisers in each of these fields.

The former Nodus Bank CEO sentenced this week will not be the last banker to face prison for mixing self-dealing with sanctions evasion. With the chairman and a former director still to be sentenced and restitution due to be fixed in December, the case will keep returning to the courts, and its lessons for governance and sanctions compliance will remain current for some time.

Frequently asked questions

Who is Tomás Niembro Concha?

He is the 64-year-old former chief executive and 60% shareholder of Nodus International Bank, a Puerto Rican international bank that failed in 2023. He holds Spanish and Venezuelan nationality. On 21 September 2026 he was sentenced in the Southern District of Florida to 112 months in prison for fraud and sanctions offences.

What was the former Nodus Bank CEO sentenced for?

He pleaded guilty on 19 March 2026 to conspiracy to commit wire fraud and conspiracy to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. The fraud took at least $24.9 million from the bank; the sanctions count concerned the unlicensed $4 million sale of a Southampton home back to a sanctioned Venezuelan.

How much money was involved in the Nodus Bank fraud?

Prosecutors said at least $24.9 million was obtained from the bank, through $11 million invested in a Miami lender and at least 47 promissory notes worth about $25.3 million. Niembro must forfeit over $16.9 million. The liquidation trustee has said Nodus owes clients about $92 million.

How did the Venezuela sanctions scheme work?

A sanctioned individual's company owed Nodus about $2.5 million. With OFAC authorisation, the bank foreclosed on his Southampton, New York home. Niembro and the individual then agreed privately that the bank would sell the house back to him for $4 million through a front company, which OFAC had not licensed.

What is the maximum penalty for an OFAC violation?

Wilful violations of IEEPA, including conspiracies, carry a fine of up to $1,000,000 and, for individuals, up to 20 years in prison. Civil penalties can reach the greater of $377,700 or twice the transaction value per violation. Since April 2024 the limitation period for both civil and criminal cases is ten years.

What is the jail sentence for bank fraud in the US?

It depends on the statute and the facts. Wire fraud and fraud conspiracies carry up to 20 years per count, and judges set the sentence using the Sentencing Guidelines. There is no federal parole, but prisoners can earn up to 54 days of good-conduct credit for each year of their sentence.

Is Venezuela still under US sanctions?

Yes. OFAC issued several general licences in 2026 easing parts of the oil sector, but no Venezuela-related executive order has been revoked and PDVSA remains on the SDN list. Easing also does not excuse past conduct: the Nodus conspiracy ran from 2021 to 2023, when the restrictions were fully in force.

Were Nodus Bank deposits insured?

No. Nodus was an international banking entity licensed in Puerto Rico under Law 52 of 1989, and its deposits were not insured by the FDIC. Depositors must look to the liquidation, OCIF's order making the two owners personally liable, and the trustee's lawsuit for any recovery.

What happens to the chairman, Juan Ramirez?

Juan Francisco Ramirez pleaded guilty on 22 September 2025 to conspiracy to commit wire fraud, admitting a scheme to obtain more than $13.6 million, and agreed to forfeit at least that amount. As of 22 September 2026 he had not been sentenced. He faces a maximum of 20 years.

Sources

1. US Department of Justice: Former bank CEO sentenced to over 9 years in prison (21 September 2026)
2. US Department of Justice: Former bank CEO pleads guilty (20 March 2026)
3. US Department of Justice: Chairman of the board of Puerto Rican bank pleads guilty (22 September 2025)
4. American Banker: Ex-CEO of failed bank sentenced for sanctions evasion (22 September 2026)
5. Caribbean Business: Former Nodus Bank CEO sentenced to nine years (22 September 2026)
6. Associated Press: Lawsuit accuses owners of Puerto Rico-based bank (11 February 2025)
7. OCIF: Complaint and order against Nodus International Bank shareholders (4 April 2024)
8. US Treasury: Treasury sanctions Venezuela's state-owned oil company PdVSA (28 January 2019)
9. Faegre Drinker: Unpacking the recent changes to the Venezuela sanctions program (March 2026)
10. OFAC: Venezuela-related sanctions
11. eCFR: 31 CFR Part 591, Venezuela Sanctions Regulations
12. 50 USC 1705: IEEPA penalties (Legal Information Institute)
13. Federal Register: OFAC inflation adjustment of civil monetary penalties (15 January 2025)
14. Baker McKenzie: Inflation adjustment for federal civil monetary penalties nixed for 2026 (May 2026)
15. Paul, Weiss: Congress raises statute of limitations for US sanctions violations to 10 years (April 2024)
16. 18 USC 1349: Attempt and conspiracy (Legal Information Institute)
17. 18 USC 1343: Fraud by wire (Legal Information Institute)
18. 18 USC 3624: Release of a prisoner (Legal Information Institute)
19. 18 USC 3583: Supervised release (Legal Information Institute)
20. 18 USC 981: Civil forfeiture (Legal Information Institute)
21. OFAC: A Framework for OFAC Compliance Commitments
22. FinCEN Alert FIN-2023-Alert002: Commercial real estate investments by sanctioned Russian elites (25 January 2023)
23. OFAC: Civil penalties and enforcement information

About this article

This analysis was researched and written by The Corporate INTL Newsroom, which covers cross-border legal, regulatory and business developments for lawyers, professional advisers and financiers in over 150 jurisdictions. It has been checked against the US Justice Department's releases on the plea and sentencing of Tomás Niembro Concha and the plea of Juan Francisco Ramirez, the Puerto Rico regulator's order against the bank's shareholders, the relevant US statutes and Treasury materials, and primary reporting. The sanctioned individual has not been publicly named and the court's sentencing reasons have not been published. This article is general information, not legal advice; for advice on a specific matter, consult a qualified adviser. Last reviewed 22 September 2026. For more analysis like this, visit the Corporate INTL newsroom or subscribe to Corporate INTL.